



Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Academic Culture

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11649/sn.3351>

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Abstract

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has brought a challenge to established "Russian" or "Slavic" departments at many Western universities. Since 2022 alternative ways of conceptualizing the field have been offered and a discourse around decolonization has developed. New ways of approaching the study of Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and other countries formerly subjected to Russian and Soviet rule have been suggested. An awareness of Ukrainian history has in recent decades influenced the current "decolonization turn". The article examines reasons behind these developments and how in recent years a discussion of epistemic bias has evolved.

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; academic programs; war; decolonization; epistemic bias

Although the war between Russia and Ukraine began on 20 February 2014, its impact on academic culture in the West was felt strongly only after the large-scale invasion of 24 February 2022. From that moment, university departments, art galleries and museums

The study was conducted at the author's own expense.

No competing interests have been declared.

Publisher: Institute of Slavic Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences.

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in Europe and North America began grappling with a new awareness of Putin's Russia, the Soviet past, and contemporary Ukraine. Think tanks in which academics discussed economic or political cooperation (or non-cooperation) with Russia focused on the war. Departments of history, political sciences, international relations and security studies discussed the nuclear threat, penetration by espionage, special operations, and disinformation. Analysts gauged the degrees of support for war within Russia and for resistance among Ukrainians. Human rights researchers began documenting torture, rapes, mass deportations, the destruction of cultural institutions, and the theft of art (for examples see Busol, 2024; Roth & Sauer, 2024). Oksana Semenik's website *Ukrainian Art History* became a popular resource for documenting and educating on this last issue. The use of modern technologies of surveillance and warfare, and of banned weapons like poison gas is also being followed, while ecologists and climate activists are assessing the difficulties that postwar reconstruction will face from millions of landmines, disasters like the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, the disruption of food production and grain shipments (see, for example, Pelley, 2024). Western policy has come under intense scrutiny, and the literature and art produced during the war has interested many researchers. The impact on academic culture has therefore been broad. The ensuing comments focus only on some changes in Slavic studies that have been the result of a recoil from Russocentrism.

Institutions

The war has provided a reminder of Ukraine's geopolitical importance and role in European history. It has also revealed how few Western scholars were developing expertise in Ukraine's language, history and culture, or had integrated the country into their research and teaching. For decades, departments and think tanks had focused on Russia, even when ostensibly dealing with the multi-national region they called the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, post-Soviet space, or Eurasia. After 2022, the study of contemporary Ukraine accelerated, as the recent appearance of numerous books and conferences indicates. Simultaneously, interest has increased in Central Asian, the Caucasus and the Baltic states.

This development has raised the issue of how to reconceptualize area studies. The term "Eurasia" has been criticized for mapping the extent of Russian power rather than reflecting the views of peoples and states in Asia, while the ubiquitous adjective "Russian" in program titles has been described as reinforcing notions of hegemony. Many programs still deem knowledge of Russian sufficient to understand what is in fact a vast territory with many languages, nations and histories. This naming practice implicitly accepts the hegemonic views of imperialists, notably of Dostoevsky. The writer claimed that Russian literature possessed a "universal responsiveness", a unique quality that allowed it to articulate all viewpoints, and hence there was no need to study any other "minority" language or culture.

The same reasoning was used to justify the imposition of Russian culture on conquered and subdued nations and to urge their assimilation.

Because terms and definitions affect perceptions, alternative ways of naming area studies have been suggested. They include the geographical configurations “Intermarium”, “Baltic to Black Sea”, “Post-imperial Eastern Europe”. Realignments along thematic lines have also been proposed, including “democracies at war”, “post-conflict states”, and “post-genocidal societies”. The aim in all cases has been to recognize diversity – of peoples, pasts and perspectives. One organizational initiative is the conference *Re(kn)own: Region(s) from Within*, held by RUTA Association for Central, South-Eastern, Eastern European, Baltic, Caucasus, Central and Northern Asia Studies in Global Conversation, which aims at transforming the regions formerly dominated by Moscow “from an object of study to an active and visible epistemic agent” (*Annual Conference*, n.d.).¹

Reclamation has been evident in museum and gallery practices, where, for example, the label “Ukrainian” is now attached to works and artists earlier identified as Russian.² This has entailed redefinition of iconic figures like Ilya Repin, Nikolai Ge, Arkhip Kuindzhi, Ivan Aivazovsky, Kazimir Malevich, David Burliuk, Sonia Delaunay, Abram Manevich, and Alexandra Exter. Recognition of their Ukrainian roots and inspiration has altered the interpretation of their biographies and art, and has challenged the Russian practice of cultural appropriation. As a result, the Courtauld Institute of Art has organized a conference on *Modernism in Ukraine: Local Contexts, Intercultural Encounters, Transnational Exchanges*. Its call for papers states:

The Russian Federation's brutal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has finally prompted a reassessment of the existing art historical canon, posing uncomfortable questions regarding the complicity of western academia and institutions in overlooking the Kremlin's neo-imperialist pretensions. The current conference seeks to harness this unprecedented moment to redress historical injustices, invest in epistemic reparations and reclaim names, events and institutions for Ukraine's cultural space. At the same time, by recognising and celebrating the country's multicultural dimension and pluralism of its artistic practices, the presented discussions will go beyond the established national paradigm to investigate cultural transfers and intercultural exchanges. (*Modernism in Ukraine*, 2024)³

1 The association issued the following announcement: “With an aim to develop these rich debates across disciplines, RUTA recognises that it is inadequate to use a single unifying label (whether ‘post-Soviet’, ‘post-communist’, ‘post-socialist’, ‘Eurasia’, ‘New East’, ‘Global East’ among others) when addressing this sociohistorically and demographically diverse and dynamic space. Thus, we refer to the ever-changing area shaped by imperial, colonial, and national violences as well as solidarity, transnational ties, and cultural exchanges as the region(s). The founding of RUTA and its inaugural conference aims to transform the region(s) from an object of study to an active and visible epistemic agent” (*Annual Conference*, n.d.).

2 New attributions have occurred in the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) and other major museums, often due to the tireless efforts of activists like Oksana Semenik.

3 The conference presented its aim as the “first-ever discussion dedicated exclusively to Ukraine's visual culture of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries to be held outside Ukraine” and a way of refusing to see Ukrainian art production through the imperialist lens of the so-called “Russian avant-garde” (*Modernism in Ukraine*, 2024).

Conceptualization

Although denied or ignored by those who still claim a Russian exceptionalism (which is often attributed to a unique spirituality), the legacy of violence in imperial and Soviet history now attracts scholarly attention. It is being examined because of the current war's brutality and Goebbels-like rhetoric. Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, has presented the invasion as a "total war", and the Russian Orthodox Church describes it as a "holy war" (Motyl, 2024). Russia's self-destructive fury is evident in these statements. The Kremlin is drawing on an old playbook – one that combines military conquest with ideological deception. Today scholars increasingly link current wartime violence to imperial history and culture, and thus open the door to a fundamental reconceptualization of both the Russian and Ukrainian pasts.

It remains unclear how frankly Russian literary scholarship is prepared to examine writings that have encouraged imperial conquest and rule. Western universities have sometimes focused on the tradition of opposition to autocracy, tsarism and imperialism in Russian literature, which stretches from Petr Chaadayev, Alexander Herzen and Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin to Boris Akunin, Vladimir Sorokin and Lyudmila Petrushevskaya.⁴ Only recently, because of the war, has the tradition of celebrating imperial nationalism, Ukrainophobia and Islamophobia, attracted analysis (see, for example, Dostlieva & Dostliev, 2022; Whitmore, 2017). This latter tradition, however, has always been embedded in the militarism, authoritarianism and revanchism of Russian culture, and has been shaped by a long history of serfdom, colonialism, racism, and xenophobia. These aspects of the culture become visible only when the viewpoint of victim groups is allowed. It is not Russophobic to conduct research into this range of issues, any more than it is "phobic" to study prejudices, deficiencies and depravities in the histories and cultures of other countries. In fact, it is crucially important to do so, because there is a pressing need to understand the disgraceful and chauvinistic statements of intellectual luminaries like Belinsky, Dostoevsky and Brodsky, and to submit to a more probing investigation writers like Pushkin, Lermontov and Tolstoy, who, as researchers have shown, at points in their lives participated in or supported violent conquest (for examples of this kind of critical analysis see Bojanowska, 2019; Dickinson, 2023; Layton, 2005; Omolesky, 2022; Shkandrij, 2001; Terekhova, 2022; Thompson, 2000).

There have, of course, been positive developments. The war has stimulated new historical studies – of both individual biographies and entire periods. A deeper knowledge of Ukraine's past, for example, is transforming the understanding of twentieth-century

4 For Sorokin's recent statements see Arkhangelsky (2023).

modernism and avant-garde (see Biedarieva, 2022; Denysova, 2022; Prymak, 2013). It is changing our picture of revolutionary movement in Russia and Ukraine. There was, after all, a Ukrainian Left, a Ukrainian Marxism and a Ukrainian national Bolshevism – all of which opposed the idea of Russian hegemony. Discussion of these currents was taboo in the Soviet Union and among the Stalinist current of Western Marxists (see, for example, Shkandrij, 1992; Velychenko, 2014). However, the historical vistas that have opened are much wider than many researchers realize. Knowledge of Ukraine's past affects how over a thousand years of European history is perceived, as scholars like Timothy Snyder, Serhii Plokhy and Yaroslav Hrytsak have argued.⁵

Ukrainian voices have long been marginalized, as many who studied in Slavic departments can testify. Even when heard, they were denied legitimacy. Privileged knowledge lay elsewhere: students were expected to become familiar with Russian texts, not Ukrainian. Mikhail Bulgakov's *White Guard* served as a guide to revolutionary events in Ukraine, not Mykola Kulish's more illuminating *Sonata Pathétique*. Bulgakov's depiction of brutish peasants, ethnic nationalists and antisemites was the standard introduction. The idea that the Ukrainian Revolution might have been fought for personal freedom and democratic norms, or that Ukrainian literature and culture embodied these values, never received a hearing.

This bias has consequences. Consider, for instance, the Revolution of Dignity in 2013–14 and the invasion of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014. They produced a stream of newspaper articles about a divided Ukraine, a Nazi fascist junta in Kyiv, persecution of Russian speakers, crucified children, and other fantasies. Western journalists who visited Kyiv on two-day trips to “get the story” posed questions about Ukrainian nationalism and antisemitism, because their editors had instructed them to focus on these issues. Meanwhile, Westsplainers in Germany, France, England, and Canada eagerly offered advice on how Ukrainians could cleanse themselves of Second World War nationalism. Few remarked upon the elephant in the room – Russia's imperial nationalism and its disinformation campaign, which portrayed its targeted victims as perpetrators. The ritualistic denunciation of Ukrainian nationalism had begun in 1991, at the moment Ukraine declared independence. *The New York Review of Books* published articles on a “not so free” Ukraine, and journalists repeatedly invoked the Second World War to indicate the country's ingrained antisemitism and pro-fascist sentiments. Few suggested at the time that this commentary was inspired by the Kremlin's influencers or by prejudices disseminated by “Russian” studies in the West. For the first six months of the war, into the second half of 2014, whenever

⁵ Plokhy's book presents “the *longue durée* history of Ukraine from the times of Herodotus to the fall of the USSR and the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict” (Plokhy, 2015, p. xxii), while Hrytsak offers an account “in the dual key of global history and the *longue durée*” (Hrytsak, 2023, p. 8). Snyder in *Bloodlands* describes the Middle Ages and Early Modern period as one in which Ukraine acted as a cultural and political entity separate from Muscovy. His podcast lectures on Ukrainian history have been heard by millions. Reappraisals of Ukrainian history have also been stimulated by books like Norman Davies's *Europe at War* and Anne Applebaum's *Red Famine*.

Ukrainian scholars and intellectuals attempted to counter these biases, their testimony was dismissed. Academic discourse had preemptively rejected their arguments, largely because patterns of thinking had already been established – in fact, institutionalized.⁶

An early turning point came on 17 July 2014, when a Russian missile shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 from Amsterdam with 283 passengers and 15 crew aboard, thus bringing the war directly to Western Europe. However, it was only in 2022 that many Western academics realized the threat to political life in their own societies and the impossibility of ignoring the war. In the next two years, over 126,000 Russian war crimes were documented, civilian neighbourhoods were bombed on a daily basis, Russian troops engaged in looting and rape, torture and deportations became the norm in occupied territories, and commentators on Kremlin TV threatened Europe and North America with nuclear attacks.

Academics responded by demanding that perpetrators of the violence be held accountable. Many Ukrainian scholars refused to appear on conference panels with counterparts from Russia, especially with those who fail to unequivocally condemn the invasion and occupation. Ukrainians would gladly participate in panels, but do not want their presence to be interpreted as legitimizing views that choose to ignore the genocidal aggression of the Russian state.⁷ Most Ukrainian researchers agree on the urgent need for critical analysis of Russia's past and present.

Why are academic programs reluctant to change? One reason is competition for funding; new hirings, courses and projects require financing. Another is unwillingness of older staff to reexamine their work. This inhibiting situation also affects flagship publications like the *Times Literary Supplement*, *New York Review of Books*, and *New Left Review*, which have been slow to introduce critical voices that challenge unexamined genuflection before Russian classics or admiration for scholars whose views have clearly been discredited by the war.

Political disagreements have also contributed to the reluctance. Repressive states are often seen as bulwarks against anarchy, or as efficient modernizers. This attitude leads to a form of apologism that affects intellectuals across the political spectrum. *Pax Americana*, *Pax Russica* and *Pax Sinica* have, for many, been convincing arguments. Another problem is anti-Westernism. In 1946, at the end of the Second World War, George Orwell argued that “the poisonous effect of the Russian *mythos* on English intellectual life” led many in the West to imagine that a better world, even a utopian one, existed outside their own, simply because it was different and they were not prepared to examine its horrors (Orwell, 1946). Similar thinking continues to produce ostrich-like behaviour among contemporary intellectuals.

6 It might be recalled that *Time* magazine made Putin person of the year in 2007, and George W. Bush “looked Putin in the eye” and saw a person that he thought could be trusted. Meanwhile Oksana Zabuzhko had her microphone shut down during a speech in Germany when she criticized the Russian president and the irrational Western belief that the democratic transformation of Russia was just around the corner. See Oksana Zabuzhko, “The Problem with Russia is Russia” (Zabuzhko, 2023).

7 On boycotts and undue Russian privilege and influence in academies see Ramachandran (2022); Dudko (2023); Kuromiya (2023); Rud (2023); Rafeyenko (2023).

The assumption that a strong Soviet state would provide stability proved wrong. So did faith in a Soviet utopia. But versions of these arguments were used for a century to excuse or ignore the suppression of rebellious nationalities, groups and individuals. Some apologists were communist sympathizers, others simply hated Western societies and believed that any alternative was better, and still others admired autocratic or imperialist regimes. Often all three groups subscribed to the idea that large economic and political units were inherently progressive, efficient or stable, particularly when ruled by the firm hand of a benevolent dictator.

Decolonization

Ukrainian scholars today pose a challenge to the field of Slavic/Russian studies by championing the issue of decolonization. Resistance to the idea of Ukraine as a victim of imperial rule comes in different guises. One is the view that “Europe” or “the West” always and everywhere represent colonialism and imperialism, and therefore these powers are only using Ukraine’s resistance to invasion in order to extend their own dominance. The answer to this charge is that an empathetic alignment is required with all oppressed peoples. Ukrainians have embraced a struggle for freedom. Unlike Russia, they do not sympathize with tyrannies, empires or right-wing dictatorships. Neutrality or anti-militarism are not an option for them because the issue is survival – not just for Ukraine, but for global relations based on civilized values. International institutions created since the Second World War, including the United Nations and international courts of justice, along with all signed agreements and conventions on human rights, war crimes and genocide, are now threatened.

Russia’s imperial ambitions have triggered a decolonial turn in scholarship on Ukraine, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Decolonizing practices are now being explored in literature, art, politics, history, cultural appropriation, and epistemology. The website *Ukrainian Decolonial Glossary*, for example, defines concepts and terms and provides examples from Ukraine’s experience. It explores postcolonial and decolonial approaches, applying concepts and methodologies analogous to those used in the study of Latin America, Africa and Asia.⁸ Racism, Orientalism, gender inequality, and repression of subaltern groups in the Soviet and Russian space are now analyzed by scholars who subscribe to the idea that coloniality represents long-standing patterns of thought and behaviour that have survived for generations and continue to fuel systematic violence. Russia, they argue, has its own form of Orientalism.⁹

⁸ See *Ukrainian Decolonial Glossary* (2024).

⁹ On Central Asia see especially Kassymbekova and Chokobaeva (2023). On the decolonial turn see Tlostanova and Mignolo (2009); Tlostanova (2010); Méheut (2024).

Edward Said's works inspired a postcolonial awareness in literary studies (see especially Said, 1979, 1993). In the 1990s, researchers indicated imperial and colonial attitudes in the tropes and patterns that characterize Russian culture, and pointed to counter-narratives in Ukrainian and other literatures (see Layton, 2005; Shkandrij, 2001; Thompson, 2000). However, the history of Ukraine poses a challenge to students of imperialism and colonialism who have for decades ignored Russia and the Soviet Union. So does the history of the Crimean Tatars, of peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia, all of whom have a rich experience to offer. And so does the history of East Europeans. Several new concepts, such as Maria Hlavajova's "postcommunist postcolonialism" and Piotr Piotrowski's idea of othering have been applied to European populations.¹⁰ Interest in this field developed rapidly after 2022 and will no doubt continue to influence academic thinking, in much the same way as emancipatory currents, such as feminism and Black, imperial/colonial, gender and indigenous studies have done.

Ukraine experienced three centuries of imperial rule, Bolshevik experimentation, Soviet oppression, and Russian aggression. Many of the country's writers and thinkers criticized Russian and Soviet rule, combatting Russian chauvinism even within the Bolshevik party.¹¹ The critique and drive for statehood led to the proclamation of a Ukrainization policy in the 1920s. For almost a decade, the official Soviet position was that Russian great-power chauvinism was the greatest danger to the new society. The critique of Russian imperial nationalism was revived in Ivan Dziuba's *Internationalism or Russification* (1964), the classic of the dissident movement (Dzyuba, 1970).

Ukraine's resistance was multi-generational. It re-emerged repeatedly following periods of elite decapitation and mass repression. All the while the society continued to express its collective identity through coops, choirs, trading associations, theatres, publications, as well as religious, cultural and political groups. The independent state of 1917–20 and the Ukrainization drive of the 1920s transformed the nation; mass revolts against collectivization and famine in the early 1930s mobilized the population; underground resistance in the 1940s revived the tradition of armed struggle; and the dissident movement of the 1960s and the revolutions between 1991 and 2014 continued the struggle for independence. Contemporary Ukrainians view this history as evidence of a long drive for national liberation.

Soviet authorities saw things differently. They emphasized the "eternal friendship" of two "brotherly peoples", and the wholehearted support of both Ukrainians and Russians for Stalin and the Communist Party. The idea of Ukraine's history as a battle for survival in the face of foreign oppression was proscribed if at any point in the narrative Russia was mentioned as one of the oppressors.

10 See Piotrowski (2009). For Hlavajova's views on the borders of empire and her work in collaborative research see *Maria Hlavajova* (n.d.).

11 For classic instances see Mazlakh and Shakhrai (1970), a translation of the 1919 document; and Khvylovy (1986), a translation of the pamphlet series of 1925–1926.

Putin's historical tract of 2021 and his entire justification for the war departed from the Soviet narrative. In his view, there was no "great friendship" between the Ukrainian and Russian nations, because there was no Ukrainian nation. Ironically, his invasion destroyed the "brotherly nations" myth, created the reality of two hostile nations, and confirmed the image of a civilized Ukraine struggling for liberation from a barbarous Russian imperialism.

Epistemic Bias

After leaving the Soviet Union, the scholar Yurii Sherekh wrote: "one can be an ideological opponent of a certain system and at the same time psychologically part of it" (Shevel'ov, 1964, p. 9). It would take many years, he said, "to regenerate those parts of the human soul that the system squeezed out, to destroy the bacilli that the regime grew in order to rot souls" (Shevel'ov, 1964, p. 9). Fellow émigrés conveyed the same message. Today, that message has taken on new meaning. Scholars who considered Ukraine insignificant are rethinking it as an agent in the shaping of European history. For decades it seemed that only one channel could be played – in the classroom, on film screens, TV, and the radio. A sixth of the earth's surface was seen through narratives crafted by Russian historians who recorded imperial consolidation – Nikolay Karamzin, Vasily Kliuchevsky, Dmitry Ilovaisky, Sergey Solovyov, among many. The growth of the Russian state was their framework. Religion, literature, politics, philosophy, history, and art were all "Russian".

Western universities followed suite. After Moscow launched the first sputnik, detonated the atom bomb, sent a cosmonaut into space, the priority became understanding the Kremlin's thinking. Ukraine was an esoteric topic. It had no voice in international affairs, even followed Moscow's lead by describing negatively any particularism in its own history. There are many examples. The Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–20 was depicted as reactionary and pogrom-laden, Stalinism as the successful collectivization and industrialization of a backward land, the Holodomor as the result of subversion by rich peasants, the Second World War as a story of fascistic nationalists, the dissidents of the 1960s as quixotic intellectuals doomed to be crushed by a modernizing state. All history was the same story of ever-expanding empire. Ukraine's language, land and people were irrelevant to this big picture. Today Putin's propagandists try to shoehorn academic discussions into a similar narrative of imperial grandeur, while ignoring Ukraine's past.

However, in 2022 Western scholars of Russian imperial or Soviet history had an epiphany; they discovered a people with its own voice, culture and history. Putin's justification for the war made no sense; his claims that there was no Ukrainian nation, state or independent history are patently absurd. The propagandist Vladislav Surkov affirmed these views, while Timofey Sergeitsev and Aleksandr Dugin called for a genocide of Ukrainians (Chesnakov & Surkov, 2020; Putin, 2021; Sergeitsev, 2022; Shandra, 2019; Shekhovtsov, 2014).

As a result of Ukraine's resistance, academics had to ask themselves why they had been so blinkered. Although political pundits on the right and left take different views of the war, Ukraine now exists on all mental maps, and the idea that the Kremlin is preordained to police the vast region between Poland and the Pacific has gone for good.

Some have expressed sympathy for Russia as history's victim, a country whose political choices were always conditioned by Western aggression. The current version of this argument is the "aggressive NATO expansion" theme (see, for example, Gerasimov, 2021; Zayarnyuk, 2022). But the genocidal attitude is the product of a violent history: conquests, serfdom, racism, and xenophobia.¹² Ukraine's history throws light on this past and on the silencing of oppositional voices.¹³

Robert Conquest's (1986) *Harvest of Sorrow* and Timothy Snyder's (2010) *Bloodlands* were turning points in Western awareness. Snyder's words on Ukraine's central importance for Hitler and Stalin read like an anticipation of Putin's behaviour:

For both Hitler and Stalin, Ukraine was more than a source of food. It was the place that would enable them to break the rules of traditional economics, rescue their countries from poverty and isolation, and remake the continent in their own image. (Snyder, 2010, p. 30)

Ukrainian researchers claim that epistemic injustice and testimonial bias have worked to silence their view of history as unreliable, to deny them resources, space in journals and conferences, and to marginalize their concerns. Ukraine is still seen through textbooks, presentations and exhibitions that gloss imperial viewpoints. Most shelves in bookstores and libraries are devoted to Russia; few to Ukraine. This is the challenge still facing Ukrainian studies. Nonetheless, the process of change has begun. Histories written by participants of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–20 are finally being translated; literature by classics of the 1920s is being made available. This enormous "archive" forms part of a recovered, independent testimony that disputes narratives written by the colonizer. For this reason, Ukraine will continue to influence the decolonization debate globally.

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¹² For articles on genocide see Mälksoo (2022) and Smith-Peter (2022a, 2022b, 2022c).

¹³ On the silencing of voices see Dudko (2023); Kuromiya (2022, 2023); Rud (2023); Shaipov and Shaipova (2023). Although Hrushevsky (1904/2014) and other Ukrainian intellectuals had already challenged the Russian state expansionist narrative prior to 1917, only in the current decolonization turn are their works attracting wider attention.

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Wpływ wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej na kulturę akademicką

Abstrakt

Inwazja Rosji na Ukrainę stanowi wyzwanie dla istniejących na wielu zachodnich uniwersytetach jednostek określanych jako „rosjoznawcze” lub „sławistyczne”. Od 2022 roku pojawiają się alternatywne sposoby konceptualizacji tej dziedziny, a jednocześnie rozwija się dyskurs wokół dekolonizacji. Proponowane są nowe podejścia do badań nad Ukrainą, Europą Wschodnią, Azją Środkową oraz innymi krajami, które niegdyś podlegały rosyjskiemu i sowieckiemu panowaniu. Świadomość ukraińskiej historii, kształtowana na przestrzeni ostatnich dekad, miała wpływ na współczesny „zwrot dekolonizacyjny”. Artykuł analizuje przyczyny tych przemian oraz rozwój dyskusji na temat stronnictwa epistemicznego w ostatnich latach.

Słowa kluczowe: Rosja; Ukraina; programy akademickie; wojna; dekolonizacja; stronnictwo epistemiczne

Citation

Shkandrij, M. (2025). Impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on academic culture. *Sprawy Narodowościowe: Seria nowa*, 2025(57), Article 3351. <https://doi.org/10.11649/sn.3351>