
Introduction

On 21 April 1920, an agreement was signed between the Republic of Poland and the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR). Poland recognized the independence of Ukraine and undertook to liberate the right-bank regions of the country from the Bolsheviks. In return, Ukraine made significant territorial concessions to Poland. As a result, a joint Polish-Ukrainian campaign began on 25 April, with Polish troops undoubtedly playing the main role. Kyiv was liberated on 7 May, but the Bolsheviks launched a counteroffensive about a month later. Eventually, after intense fighting on the outskirts of Warsaw, the Polish leadership signed a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks at Riga; Poland recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, although the UPR delegation was not even allowed to negotiate. In the end, under the terms of the treaty, Ukrainian troops were interned. This is a simplified and very brief presentation.
of the essence of the Eastern policy of Józef Piłsudski. Although Poland continued to support the Ukrainian government in exile, plans to support Ukraine as a buffer between Poland and the Soviet Union had failed.

There has been much discussion about Piłsudski’s Eastern policy in the literature. However, a consensus has been reached that the goal of this policy was to separate Ukraine from Russia in order to weaken Russia’s influence in Europe. Of course, in the Soviet Union, such a policy was perceived as nationalist and anti-Russian. In Poland, the war of 1920 became firmly entrenched in national mythology as a struggle against invaders. Soviet historiography also positioned this war as a defensive one. In Poland, support to the Ukrainian People’s Republic in the war against the Bolsheviks was viewed as pursuit of the noble goal of realizing the Ukrainians’ right to self-determination (among Piłsudski’s supporters; the National Democrats strongly opposed such a policy from the beginning), whereas Soviet historiography portrayed it as Polish imperialism. In the Soviet narrative, Ukrainian troops were traitors and collaborators. According to the Bolsheviks, only the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had the right to represent the interests of Ukrainians as a state.

Thus, in the 1920s and 1930s, there were conflicting narratives between Poland and the USSR. However, after World War II, Poland found itself in the Soviet sphere of influence, which led to a wave of political emigration. Among those who left the country were many historians, who continued the tradition of independent historiography in exile. On the other hand, after the establishment of the communist regime in Poland, the authorities pursued a historical policy that corresponded to Poland’s position as a Soviet satellite.

Considering this state of affairs, the memory policy of communist Poland towards Piłsudski’s Eastern policy is an exciting and crucial historical issue. Its study allows us to understand the mechanism and scale of manipulation of history in one of the largest countries in the socialist camp and the use of history as a political tool.

**A brief overview of previous studies**

The proposed topic has already been partly explored in previous studies. Eugeniusz Koko investigated the issues of Polish-Ukrainian relations in 1918–1939 in Polish historiography (Koko, 1994, 1999), including the Piłsudski-Petlura Pact (as he calls it), but paid little attention to the memory politics of the Polish People’s Republic (Koko, 1996). Marek Dutkiewicz (2009) notes that political subordination to the Soviet Union and the lack of dialogue with Ukrainian historians negatively influenced the study of the problem. Rafał Stobiecki, in turn, has analyzed the functioning of Polish history-writing under the control of the communist regime, highlighting the main stages in its development and characterizing their respective peculiarities
(Stobiecki, 2007). The state of historical science in the Polish People's Republic and its dependence on the political situation have been discussed in detail by Tadeusz Rutkowski (2008), and the functioning of censorship in history-writing in Poland – by Zbigniew Romek (2006, 2010). The dependence of Polish history policy on the USSR and the mechanisms of Moscow's influence on Polish politics in the historical sphere have been extensively analyzed by Jan Szumski (2016). However, there is no separate study devoted to the topic of Piłsudski's Eastern policy in the memory policy of the Polish People's Republic. Indeed, it has only been touched upon as part of the broader perspective.

Discussion

The first postwar years in Polish history-writing were characterized by considerable pluralism, both in the organizational sphere (personnel, institutions) and in terms of methodology and content (interpretation canons). The period was dominated by an atmosphere of debate and polemics (Stobiecki, 2007, p. 112), and there were no radical moves in science at the time (Romek, 2010, p. 109). In their reports, Soviet censors supervising Poland criticized censorship in the country in 1944–1945 as too weak (Romek, 2010, pp. 34–35). Tadeusz Rutkowski notes that the first years after the end of the war were a period of relative freedom to pursue science, especially in comparison with the following years. The reason for this state of affairs was primarily the weakness of the communist authorities in Poland and the then policy of the USSR aimed at taking over full political control in the countries subject to it (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 94).

According to Rutkowski, specific concepts of organizational change in science and at universities began to crystallize in late 1946 and early 1947 (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 97); the strengthening of control over science began after the 1947 elections (Romek, 2010, p. 110). Towards the end of the 1940s, the Stalinization of Polish history-writing began in the new realities, both domestic (elimination of legal and illegal opposition) and international (Cold War). In memory policy, as Rafał Stobiecki points out, Stalinism was an attempt to create an ideological vision of the past, the objective of which was to legitimize the totalitarian regime. This goal was served by the change of methodology, and, on the other hand, the reorganization or elimination of the former organizational structures and the creation of new ones. According to Stobiecki, the exclusive division into scientific Marxist historiography and “anti-scientific”, infertile bourgeois historiography made any controversy impossible. In Stalin's theory of history, methodology was equated with ideology (Stobiecki, 2007, p. 127). In this period, the topic of Polish Eastern policy in the early years of independence was not popular. The main task of historians was to prove the Polishness of the newly incorporated Western Territories.
The turn of the 1950s saw the beginning of a new historiographical period: Polish historiography gradually switched to the principles of Soviet historiography. This was the period of classic Stalinism. The aim of the authorities was to create an official historiography and eliminate other approaches to history. Characterizing the Stalinist period, Jan Szumski notes that at that time probably no science in the world was ideologically linked so strongly to the party supervision system, meeting the current needs of the party and the government, as the Soviet historical science. The level of manipulation of history, in his opinion, was so great that it is best characterized by the Orwellian maxim “who controls the past, controls the future; who controls the present controls the past”. Moscow tried to impose a similar system of political supervision of history on the countries of “people’s democracy”, including Poland. “Moreover, care was taken to eliminate issues that could present the historical role of Russia and the USSR in a negative light” (Szumski, 2016, p. 38). In Szumski’s opinion, the greatest deformations and political pressures from the Kremlin were the case in research on the interwar period and World War II (Szumski, 2016, p. 383). The regime tried to impose Soviet methodological and institutional patterns on the scholars. The remains of independent institutions and periodicals were eliminated, and a total monopoly of the communist party on information was introduced. Consequently, scholarly contacts with the West were almost completely severed. The previous narrative, which dominated in Polish historiography in the interwar period (Borymskyi, 2021), was rejected entirely. Implementing the desired memory policy would have been impossible without institutions of supervision and control. Among them, it is worth noting the Department of Science and Higher Education at the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (this unit changed its name many times); the Institute of History of the Party; the Institute for the Education of Scientific Personnel, affiliated with the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR); the Marxist Historians’ Association; and the Main Office for the Control of the Press, Publications and Events.

In addition, when talking about censorship, it is worth remembering that it also worked indirectly. As Zbigniew Romek notes, censorship functions in the field of science were performed primarily by publishing houses, editorial offices of journals, directors of institutes, heads of departments, academic councils, and the authors themselves. All these people, bearing in mind their professional careers, prevented the freedom of writing and promoting one’s own image of reality, inconsistent with the current pattern (Romek, 2006, p. 23). The level of ideologization in the interpretation of the events of 1920 was incredibly high. The study of the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance and other issues of the Polish-Soviet war was a highly complex problem.

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1 This and all subsequent quotations from publications in Polish have been translated by Vitalii Borymskyi.
Considering the political dependence of Warsaw on Moscow, it was expected that the interpretation of these topics should not contradict Soviet propaganda. At the same time, it was necessary to avoid insulting the patriotic feelings of Poles, which was a challenging task.

For a better understanding of the issues under discussion, it is worth presenting the most revealing theses replicated in the Soviet literature. For example, a Soviet monograph from that period considers the agreement between Petlura and Piłsudski in the context of the struggle against external intervention and internal counterrevolution. According to this concept, Poland, along with Wrangel, was the main tool of the Entente for the destruction of the world’s first state of workers and peasants. Soviet Russia is depicted as a victim of aggression, seeking peace and repeatedly trying to establish peaceful relations with Poland. However, as argued, to capture Soviet Ukraine, Polish imperialists called for the assistance of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, led by Petlura, who was ready to serve any foreign invaders for the sake of restoring bourgeois-landlordism in Ukraine (Лихолат, 1955).

In the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course, which was the most authoritative source of historical knowledge in the USSR in the period of Stalinism, the events of 1920 were presented in the following way:

The Polish gentry and Wrangel, as Lenin put it, were the two hands with which international imperialism attempted to strangle Soviet Russia. The plan of the Poles was to seize the Soviet Ukraine west of the Dnieper, to occupy Soviet Byelorussia, to restore the power of the Polish magnates in these regions, to extend the frontiers of the Polish state so that they stretched “from sea to sea,” from Danzig to Odessa, and, in return for his aid, to help Wrangel smash the Red Army and restore the power of the landlords and capitalists in Soviet Russia. This plan was approved by the Entente states. (Commission of the CC of the CPSU(B), 1951, p. 371)

It is no coincidence that in Poland the position of the state in the field of history was also best reflected in propaganda journalism. Nevertheless, a traditional scheme where “our troops are good and invaders’ troops are bad” could not be used here. It was thus necessary to create a narrative in which Bolsheviks would wage a lawful war. Consequently, the authors made accusations not against Poland as such but against the Polish authorities, which were portrayed as utterly anti-people. At the same time, most works emphasized that the common people had been against the war with Soviet Russia. It is vital to add that this period’s Polish policy of memory was characterized by other distortions that came from the USSR; one of these was the extensive citation of Lenin and Stalin.

According to the image created in works from that period, Piłsudski, in his actions, was only a tool of the Entente and implemented the counterrevolutionary goals of the international, including the Polish, bourgeois and landlords. These actions were imperialistic and aggressive, aiming to restore large land properties and the
position of prominent industrialists. In this description, Petlura represented the same traits. He was a counterrevolutionary who acted in the interests of small groups of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and kulaks (wealthy peasants). On the contrary, the Soviet side was portrayed as undeniably sincere in its peaceful intentions. The propaganda of the Polish People’s Republic tried to discredit Piłsudski (Romek, 2010, p. 246).

Szumski notes that “the obsessive hatred of the period of the Second Polish Republic and personally of Piłsudski and his camp largely determined historical assessments” (Szumski, 2016, p. 383). It must be said that such discrediting was not an easy task due to the prewar cult of Piłsudski: the fight against Russia and the Battle of Warsaw were extremely important elements of his heroic image (Cichoracki, 2001, p. 58). One of the fundamental assumptions in the research on the interwar period was that after the partitions Poland had regained its independence not thanks to the “imperialist” war but thanks to the socialist revolution. For example, Henryk Jabłoński stated: “it is indisputable that in its further consequences, the October Revolution brought independence to the Polish nation” (Jabłoński, 1958, p. 1042). Another dogma was that prewar Poland had not been fully sovereign, but dependent on the policies of big capital and Western countries (Romek, 2010, p. 248).

A full expression of these ideas can be found in a 1950 booklet under the eloquent title Zmowa grabieżców. Awantura Piłsudskiego w 1920 r. [A Conspiracy of Robbers: Piłsudski’s Gamble of 1920] (Arski et al., 1950). Writing in a pure Soviet style, the authors call the 1920 campaign “the third campaign of the Entente” (Arski et al., 1950, p. 28). According to this concept, Poland and Wrangel were not independent geopolitical players but only obedient tools of the West: the two hands of the Entente. As stressed, Piłsudski envisaged a special role in his plans for Petlura. The Ukrainian leader is described as a political adventurer and a “chauvinist gang leader” who lacked widespread public support. Interestingly, in the context of the events of 1920, the authors refer to the Red Army as a “liberation army”, not an occupational one. In their view, Piłsudski needed the alliance with Petlura only to facilitate the exploitation of Ukraine. However, due to the fact that Petlura, like another protégé of Piłsudski, General Bulak-Balakhovich, had no influence among his people, all these plans turned out to be a complete failure (Arski et al., 1950, p. 68). Finally, as summarized in the pamphlet, “history has thrown away the reorganization traditions of 1920”, implying the establishment of a socialist system in Poland (Arski et al., 1950, p. 76).

While the above text belongs to the genre of political propaganda, a 1955 article by Bolesław Jaworznicki is an example of academic history-writing in Poland during the Stalinist period. However, their rhetoric is almost identical. According to Jaworznicki, “the reactionaries, who, with the help of the Entente countries, intercepted power in the state, pushed Poland on the path of anti-Soviet gambles – relying on imperialist protectors in their attempt to realize the traditional aspirations of the nobility to enslave the neighboring Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands”
(Jaworzniicki, 1955, p. 43). The author emphasizes that the newly established Polish state, “formed as a result of the Great Socialist Revolution in Russia” and managed by the landlord-bourgeois government, was unable to conduct a genuinely independent policy that would be in line with the interests of the Polish people. The Entente, on which the Polish government was allegedly wholly dependent, tried to use Poland as a tool against the Bolsheviks (Jaworzniicki, 1955, p. 43). Both political camps – Socialists (Piłsudski supporters, Pol. pilsudczycy) and National Democrats (Pol. endecja) – are described as anti-Soviet, and the difference between them is explained only by political methods. According to Jaworzniicki, the socialists wanted to create a formally independent bourgeois Ukrainian state that would be politically and militarily dependent on Warsaw. The Polish capitalists and landlords would therefore have a privileged position. National Democrats, through their extreme nationalism, denied Ukraine’s right to exist, and, under the influence of France, sought to reconcile with “Russian counterrevolutionary nationalism” in order to partition the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, which would enable the two sides to carry out Polonization and Russification (Jaworzniicki, 1955, p. 49). Simultaneously, Piłsudski, in the author’s opinion, blindly fulfilling the will of the Entente, sought to use a military campaign against Soviet Russia to implement his federal plan, the first stage of which was the creation of bourgeois Ukraine, which would be dependent on Poland (Jaworzniicki, 1955, p. 52). Finally, Jaworzniicki calls the Kyiv operation of the Polish Army “a hopeless adventure, deadly from any point of view” for the interests of Poland (Jaworzniicki, 1955, p. 55).

There were also other echoes of Soviet interpretations. One of the pamphlets argued that the Polish military disaster of 1939 had resulted from Poland’s aggressive policy against Soviet Russia, including the war of 1920:

What happened did not come out of nowhere. In September 1939, the Polish nation reaped the bitter, utterly bitter fruits of betrayal, apostasy, short-sightedness, stupidity, ignorance, self-interest, egoism, and venality, but above all – the betrayal of those who had ruled the country for twenty years. Those who built the Polish state in 1918 built it on the foundations of the class rule of the bourgeoisie and landowners, making it a bastion of counterrevolution against the young Soviet State from the very beginning. (Arski, 1952, p. 9)

The author lamented that after taking power in Warsaw in November 1918, Piłsudski immediately began organizing the armed forces of the newly emerging state for expeditions to the east, completely neglecting the issue of indigenous Polish lands under Prussia. This included anti-Soviet provocations, deals with White tsarist generals, and finally the Polish offensive on Kyiv. According to the author, Stefan Arski,

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2 The supporters of Poland’s Marshal Józef Piłsudski.
3 National Democracy, also known by its abbreviation ND and referred to as the Endecja.
it had been a series of criminal political actions “that had sold Poland to the dark forces of imperialism and made it a submissive tool of anti-Soviet plans of world reaction” (Arski, 1952, p. 14). He drew the following insights from it:

For [those of] us who are building a new Poland, socialist Poland of the people, those damned years that led to September [of 1939] are a bitter historical lesson. We must not fail to learn from it. We return to it with our thoughts, we study its sources and causes, so that such a disaster will never happen to the Polish nation again. (Arski, 1952, p. 63)

The year 1956 brought about enormous changes, which marked the next period of memory policy, lasting until the late 1970s. The de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union also meant the liberalization of the regime in Poland. After mass protests and riots in October 1956, Władysław Gomułka became the first secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR. As a result, censorship and ideological pressure were substantially mitigated. This period is known as the “Gomułka thaw”. After 1956, voices about the need to change the state policy towards science and culture began to appear in social and cultural periodicals and academic journals. On the Soviet side, that was received with reluctance (Romek, 2010, p. 202). The academic and research community put pressure on the authorities, demanding liberalization in the field of historical policy and freedom of research into the past. Assessing the period 1948–1956, many scholars spoke of “a breach of trust in Marxist historiography” (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 279).

The peak of these processes, according to Rutkowski, came in the summer of 1956, when the Polish United Workers’ Party cell at the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences adopted a resolution stating that “the political situation of 1949–1954 […] had led to extremely harmful consequences and threatened to degenerate the very essence of science” (Rutkowski, 2008, pp. 282–283). Rutkowski notes that the most rapid changes in that period took place in the milieu of party historians (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 583). Szumski writes that after 1956, the growing difference between the level of freedom of research in Poland and in the USSR is clearly visible (Szumski, 2016, pp. 383–384). On the wave of democratization in the second half of the 1950s, certain discrepancies appeared between the canon of Soviet party historical science and the opinions of Polish party historical institutions. According to Szumski, the most important achievement of that time was Moscow’s consent to Poland having its own version of history, slightly different from the Soviet one, especially in relation to earlier periods (Szumski, 2016, pp. 382–383). However, democratization had its limits. In the works and memoirs published in that period, any anti-Russian accents were still ruthlessly censored. Therefore, descriptions of the war of 1920 or relations between the USSR and the Second Polish Republic could only be published in a version that unequivocally accused the Poles of mistakes in dealing with the Russians (Romek, 2010, p. 264).
This period also saw the critique of Stalinist methods of managing science and a certain revival of methodological and interpretive pluralism. According to Sto-
biecki, “a special feature of the situation that arose after 1956 was a ‘tacit non-aggres-
sion pact’ between the authorities and historians” (Stobiecki, 2007, p. 140). In the
following years, the authorities abandoned the previous policy of strict control over
historiography, satisfied only with control over certain issues. Historians, in turn, at
the level of self-censorship, simply avoided problematic questions. Towards the end
of this phase, state control had gradually weakened. These changes brought on a sig-
nificant revival of research on Polish Eastern policy in 1919–1920, resulting in arti-
cles and monographs by, among others, Henryk Jabłoński (1961), Józef Lewandowski
Mikulicz (1971), Weronika Gostyńska (1972), Adolf Juzwenko (1973), Zofia Zaks
(1972), and Tadeusz Dąbkowski (1985). Many of these works concerned the Pol-
ish-Ukrainian relations in the period prior to April 1920 and made a significant con-
tribution to the study of this issue. For example, the works of Józef Kukulka (1970)
and Maria Nowak-Kiełbikowa (1975), which examined the positions of France
and Great Britain, expanded knowledge on the international aspects of Piłsudski’s
actions.

A powerful impetus for research came from the multi-volume edition of docu-
ments entitled “Documents and Materials of the History of Polish-Soviet Relations”,
the second volume of which covered the period from November 1918 to the end
of April 1920, that is, before the beginning of the Kyiv operation (Gostyńska et al.,
1961). The volume includes documents from a number of archives: Polish – the Cen-
tral Archive of Modern Records, the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Archive of the Institute of History of the Party, the Central Archives of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs, the Central Military Archives; Soviet – the Central State Archives
of the October Revolution, the Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, the Central
Party Archive of the Marxist-Leninist Institute, the Historical-Diplomatic Archives
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; German – the German Central Ar-
chives in Potsdam; and émigré – the Archives of General Sikorski in London. The
volume contains important documents related to the Polish-Ukrainian negotiation
process, Poland's policy towards Ukraine, and others.

In the 1960s, the previous scheme of the interpretation of 1920 was applied. Po-
land – Petlura’s ally and the forces that supported him were regarded as politically
bankrupt. The authors, as a rule, emphasized, and sometimes significantly exag-
gerated, the influence of large landowners on Piłsudski. Artur Leinwand presented
a slightly different view on this issue in his Polska Partia Socjalistyczna wobec wojny
polsko-radzieckiej 1919–1920 [The Polish Socialist Party’s Stance on the Polish-Soviet
War of 1919–1920] (Leinwand, 1964). In his opinion, Poland had aspired to
use the natural wealth of Ukraine rather than defend the interests of the landlords
(Leinwand, 1964, p. 147). He drew attention to the unsigned draft economic agreement between Poland and the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which most accurately reflected the Polish plans for Ukraine. Emphasizing the colonial nature of the draft agreement, Leinwand viewed it as a plan for the expansion of Polish capital, which had treated Ukraine as an area of exploitation of raw materials in semi-colonial conditions and as a market for the sale of certain industrial goods. Without denying the landlords’ desire to return to their estates, Leinwand believed that Poland had been interested in Ukraine mainly as a raw material appendix and market. He also argued that, in the Ukrainian territories occupied after 25 April 1920, the Polish leadership had tried to “create a simulacrum of independence of the Dnieper Ukraine” (Leinwand, 1964, p. 150).

Over time, the counterrevolutionary aspect of Polish politics was examined less frequently. One case in point is Adolf Juzwenko’s monograph Polska a “biała” Rosja (od listopada 1918 do kwietnia 1920 r.) [Poland and “White” Russia: From November 1918 to April 1920] (Juzwenko, 1973). The study investigates Poland’s stance on Russia, especially the contradiction between the interests of Piłsudski and White generals. Juzwenko substantially argues that the war of 1920 was not aimed at restoring the power of the Whites in Russia, since Piłsudski considered the White movement to be a greater enemy to Poland than the Bolsheviks, because of their slogans of a single indivisible Russia. Considering Piłsudski’s program, he argues that it was intended to limit Russia to its ethnic territories and to create buffer states, with Ukraine as the main one. However, it was not a program that would fully satisfy the independence ambitions of peoples living in the lands between Poland and Russia (Juzwenko, 1973, pp. 266–267).

In this period, Piłsudski’s policy was often characterized as federalist, and the dominant idea was that, as Jabłoński wrote, “in real life” the federalist slogans had been more “prosaic” and easily translated into a real language of imperialist expansion. But Petlura had to combine his nationalism with the betrayal of national interests, trying at least to bargain the easiest conditions while accepting the political, military and economic superiority of those who squelched the liberation aspirations of Western Ukraine. (Jabłoński, 1961)

However, there was no complete consensus on this issue. Some historians argued that Piłsudski had been flexible in his Ukrainian policy. According to Aleksy Deruga, although the Belvedere camp had no clear plan (Deruga, 1970, p. 45), Piłsudski understood “the dialectic unity of the Ukrainian question, that is, the situation in the Dnieper Ukraine [Central] and the Dniester Ukraine [Western], as well as the so-called Russian question” (Deruga, 1969, p. 229). In Deruga’s opinion, from the very beginning of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict the leadership of the Dnieper Ukraine...
tried to put an end to it. Therefore, the Ukrainian People's Republic never officially declared war on Poland, although de facto fought against Poland over Galicia (Derega, 1969, p. 28).

Leopold Sorochtej, in turn, analyzed the views of a number of Polish political parties on the Ukrainian issue and their conceptions in this regard (Sorochtej, 1962). Writing about the policy of National Democrats towards Ukraine, he referred to their concept of a national state as a theory of national egoism, which had not considered the satisfaction of the national aspirations of national minorities, including Ukrainians. As for the Polish left-wing politicians, he believed that Piłsudski's camp had failed to put forward a clear plan towards Ukraine: their pro-Ukrainian promises had been related to the plans of the Eastern policy. Sorochtej stressed that Piłsudski supporters' propaganda had criticized the National Democrats’ program only to gain political allies, and this had not prevented them from pursuing a similar policy (Sorochtej, 1962, p. 208).

Some historians did not share the opinion of Piłsudski's federalism. For instance, a 1962 study analyzing the contents of the April agreement rejects the idea that it was federalist in nature (Lewandowski, 1962b, p. 109). In this analysis, Józef Lewandowski emphasizes that some of Piłsudski's supporters favored a broad compromise with Ukrainians. In particular, he notes, Tadeusz Hołówko advocated for the recognition of Ukraine's independence without postulating a federation, albeit only achieving a tentative rapprochement. For the sake of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, he even proposed conceding a large part of Galicia to Ukraine, with the exception of Lviv and Boryslav (Lewandowski, 1962b, p. 91).

Lewandowski notes that the Treaty of Warsaw belonged to the category of international treaties, which could have grave political implications. The clauses of the treaty did not have those consequences, since they were not implemented due to failure of Piłsudski's plans. However, the treaty was an integral part of his Eastern policy, and thus it affected the political life of interwar Poland and the mentality of Polish society in the following years. Possibly this was the main consequence of the Treaty of Warsaw (Lewandowski, 1962b, p. 105).

Lewandowski also draws attention to differences in the text of the Warsaw Treaty as published in Ukrainian by Serhiĭ Shelukhyn⁴ and Oleksander Dotsenko.⁵ He suggests that this was due to the absence of the Ukrainian version of the text

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⁴ Ukrainian politician who strongly condemned the alliance with Poland in his book Варшавський договір між Поляками й С. Петлюрою 21 квітня 1920 року [The Warsaw Agreement Between the Poles and S. Petlura, 21 April 1920] (Шелухин, 1926).

⁵ Personal adjutant of Symon Petlura. He described the alliance with Poland in Літопис Української Революції: Матеріали й документи до історії Української Революції [A Chronicle of the Ukrainian Revolution: Materials and Documents for the History of the Ukrainian Revolution] (Доценко, 1923).
when the Treaty was signed, and, accordingly, their respective texts were self-made translations. Perhaps this fact, and not the desire to humiliate the Ukrainian side, could explain the provision according to which in case of differences between the Ukrainian and Polish versions, the Polish version would prevail (Lewandowski, 1962b, pp. 107–108). He also notes that the Treaty did not foresee any federal ties between Poland and Ukraine, but only a military alliance against Soviet Russia. Lewandowski observes certain analogies between the Kurdynovskyi agreement and the April agreement. One of the most important common features is that “the Polish state openly advocated the interests of Polish landlords as a force that restored them in their estates and property rights” (Lewandowski, 1962b, p. 109). According to Lewandowski, the main difference, in turn, is that the Kurdynovskyi agreement explicitly and disrespectfully imposed a protectorate, and in the Treaty of Warsaw, although there was inequality and Ukrainian dependence on Poland, the wording was more restrained. As he points out, the behavior of Polish military and civilian administration was quite in line with the spirit of the agreements – characterized by conceit, brutality, and cruelty. Lewandowski calls Petlura a “shield” of the Kyiv offensive, a figure who did not represent any real power. Thus, those Belvedere circles who considered otherwise greatly overestimated him. “An agreement with Petlura”, Lewandowski concludes, “was an agreement with a political corpse, and it seems that Warsaw realized that” (Lewandowski, 1962b, p. 111). In his later monograph, Lewandowski notes that the Polish-Ukrainian campaign failed not only because of the disproportion between the Polish and Russian military potential but also because Piłsudski entered Ukraine with a “faded and defamed flag”. In his opinion, in 1920, Poland concluded an agreement not with a power that was real, but – even in the understanding of Piłsudski supporters, who overestimated the “Petlurists” – with the potential, which could be restored with Polish help. Great hopes relied on the slogan “For your freedom and ours”, but these hopes were not fulfilled.

According to Lewandowski, for Piłsudski, federalism was not an implementation of the principle of national self-determination, but an attempt to camouflage aggression in the area of expansion and use the political romanticism of a part of Polish society. The scholar also emphasizes the insincerity of the federalist rhetoric of the Piłsudskites with the argument that the March 1921 constitution “definitely crossed out all federalist fantasies” (Lewandowski, 1958, p. 107). He considers the ideology of Prometheism, which arose later, a new face of federalism in the changed conditions of a stabilized Europe, where Poland remained at peace with the Soviet Union (Lewandowski, 1958, p. 109). He argues that support for the independence aspirations of national minorities in the USSR in fact amounted to following German policy. Lewandowski blames the Promethean movement for a rapprochement with Hitler’s Germany, a move which, in his view, aimed at war against the USSR (Lewandowski, 1959, pp. 34–35). He also notes that the leading ideologue of Piłsudski’s camp, Leon
Wasilewski, wrote about the separation of only part of Ukraine from Russia, ignoring the right of Ukrainians to self-determination in the rest of its territory. Thus, the federalist program actually envisaged a kind of division of Ukraine (Lewandowski, 1962a, p. 50). In these plans, the leader of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Petlura, was to become only “a convenient cover for the veiled aggression in Ukraine” (Lewandowski, 1962a, p. 162).

The events of March 1968 led to further liberalization of the authorities’ policy towards history (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 589). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a slow process began of liberating the academic environment from self-control and submission to the system of creative censorship. Historians began to “manifest their attitudes independent of the imposed restrictions more and more boldly, although still in a very restrained way” (Romek, 2006, p. 36). The history-writing of the 1970s continued to be dominated by views on federalism. Characteristic in this regard is the study by Sergiusz Mikulicz devoted to Prometheus in the politics of interwar Poland (Mikulicz, 1971). Mikulicz notes the favorable attitude of Piłsudski to Ukrainians, at the same time, however, observing that he had to consider the opinion of several influential circles in Poland, among which the attitude towards the Ukrainian question was clearly negative. The position of the Entente was also significant. Mikulicz stresses the inequality of Ukraine and Poland in the Warsaw Treaty, which he calls “a treaty on the protectorate”, a protectorate in relation to a state that had yet to appear (Mikulicz, 1971, pp. 95–96).

Mikulicz also analyzes the provisions of the political and military conventions, where the first thing that attracts his attention is the clause stating that “Poland recognizes the Directory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, led by Ataman Petlura” (Mikulicz, 1971, p. 96). This formulation, in his opinion, gave Poland different interpretive possibilities after the death of Petlura (Mikulicz, 1971, p. 96). Indeed, Poland recognized the right of Ukraine to independence but did not require – patronizingly – the Ukrainian recognition of Poland’s independence. In Article 3, the superiority of Poland over the Ukrainian partner is apparent even more sharply in the wording of the Polish history of the lands that were to form the future Ukrainian state. According to Mikulicz, the formulation of Article 5, which concerned national rights, amounted to injustice. At first glance, the provision ensuring equal rights of Ukrainians in Poland and Poles in Ukraine seems to be equivalent in principle. The injustice, as he points out, was that the Polish minority in the Dnieper Ukraine was insignificant and scattered, while Ukrainians in Galicia and Volhynia constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. Article 6, in turn, permitted Poland’s interference in Ukraine’s major internal problem – the land issue. According to Mikulicz, it was included to protect Polish land ownership in right-bank Ukraine. However, in his opinion, Warsaw was more interested in the possibility of using the riches of Ukraine than the protection of the Polish landowners in the Kresy (Mikulicz, 1971, p. 98).
The provision according to which in case of doubt only the Polish text had legal force was a sign of disdain, Mikulicz argues. Polish intentions regarding Ukraine could be seen even more clearly in the draft economic convention, which, although not signed, should be considered an important addition to the Warsaw Treaty. According to Mikulicz, the convention was clearly exploitative, almost semi-colonial in nature (Mikulicz, 1971, p. 99). Among the reasons for the failure of the Polish-Ukrainian conception, Mikulicz notes the territorial issue: Petlura who would not abandon Galicia would not benefit Poland, but Petlura who abandoned Galicia lost the trust of three quarters of his troops and, accordingly, his political weight (Mikulicz, 1971, p. 101).

When discussing Mikulicz’s book, it is worth quoting his description of the intellectual atmosphere of the time. He points out that when researching such a “dangerous” topic as Prometheus or Piłsudski’s Eastern policy, it was necessary to “add pro-Soviet sauce to the text wherever possible” to make the book “digestible for censorship” in order to be able to publish it (Iwański et al., 2013, p. 211). However, Mikulicz notes that in the 1970s the risk for a historian was not so great as in previous years because dependence on the USSR was lower than in the 1950s (Iwański et al., 2013, p. 221). So, the censorship treated his book “decently” and the cuts were mild (Iwański et al., 2013, p. 222). Nevertheless, some supervision from Moscow still took place because the search for sources in the USSR or talks with Soviet historians on such a sensitive topic for Russians could be “suicidal” for a Polish historian (Iwański et al., 2013, p. 220). As Romek notes, authors were usually forced to compromise between the expectations of the authorities and their own views. In order to protect the text from too far-reaching interference of censorship, they added clichés that were in force at the time. “Many contemporary recipients were able to read texts in such a way that they omitted official, stereotypical formulas, and focused on what was critical in them and undermined the interpretations established by the authorities. It was a kind of way to deceive the censorship” (Romek, 2010, p. 9).

Another critical issue was the international context of Piłsudski’s Eastern policy. While during Stalinism the whole international situation was reduced to a primitive scheme in which the Entente had allegedly tried to use Poland to attack the Bolsheviks, in the 1970s this approach underwent significant changes. The most important in this regard is a study by Maria Nowak-Kiełbikowa, who considers the Ukrainian issue through the prism of Polish-English relations. She notes that Great Britain avoided a sharp course towards Poland; the main reasons for this were the lack of a reasonable alternative to Polish policy and the desire to stabilize the situation on the continent, especially during the trade negotiations with Soviet Russia (Nowak-Kiełbikowa, 1975).

The last period was the 1980s, when, despite some pressure on researchers, a gradual liberation of history took place under state supervision. It should be noted, however, that during this period there were few works devoted to the Polish-
Ukrainian Alliance of 1920. Marek Baumgart (1985) explored the position of London. The monograph by Jacek Wędrowski (1990), in turn, was devoted to the position of the United States. In his biography of Piłsudski, Andrzej Garlicki noted that Piłsudski had needed Petlura and his government “primarily as a cover” for his actions. The Head of State, in Garlicki’s view, had treated the idea of the Ukrainian statehood with reserve (Garlicki, 1979, p. 337). Jerzy Krasuski, agreeing that Piłsudski had put forward a federation program to split Russia, stated that the Head of State had not been concerned with the lack of mention of the forthcoming federal link in the Warsaw Treaty, forecasting Petlura’s forced dependence on Poland (Krasuski, 1985, p. 28). Krasuski went even further, referring obviously to Stanisław Cat-Mackiewicz. He argued that “Piłsudski did not believe in the state-building abilities of Lithuanians, Belarusians, even Ukrainians. He looked at them as potential future Poles. In that sense, he was not a real federalist” (Krasuski, 1985, p. 28).

In the second half of the 1980s, authors were able to depart from Soviet interpretive patterns and express their opinions more and more freely. Although Jerzy Kumaniecki emphasized the peaceful intentions of the Bolsheviks, he did not place responsibility for the war solely on Poland: “The genesis of the armed conflict was influenced, on the one hand, by Piłsudski taking power in Poland […], and, on the other hand, by the theories shaping the foreign policy of Soviet Russia” (Kumaniecki, 1985, pp. 14–15). According to Kumaniecki, the bad arrangement of Polish-Russian relations “was caused by the misdeeds of Tsarist Russia’s government towards the Polish nation, which later, through other injuries, made it difficult for Poland to pursue a real policy” (Kumaniecki, 1985, p. 62). It is significant that in his study Symon Petlura appeared as a man “heading the Ukrainian People’s Republic” and not as a bandit warlord, as he had often been described in previous periods. The idea was that Petlura had aimed at separating from Soviet Russia lands where a Ukrainian state could be created, with the capital in Kyiv. “Piłsudski wanted to connect Poland and the Dnieper Ukraine with a bond of federalism, which would be a serious counterbalance to Soviet Russia” – stated Kumaniecki (1985, p. 166). Another manifestation of research freedom was quoting the works of émigré authors – in other words, anti-Soviet ones. Andrzej Chojnowski, for example, in his work devoted to the Piłsudski camp, quoted émigré historians, especially Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski and Paweł Zaremba (an associate of Radio Free Europe), and underground authors such as Wojciech Roszkowski (writing under the name of Andrzej Albert) (Chojnowski, 1986, p. 245). Such a situation was simply unimaginable in the USSR and most countries of the socialist camp.

An example of the narrative dominating in the 1980s is Eugeniusz Koko’s study of the Ukrainian policy of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and Piłsudski in 1918–1920 (Koko, 1989). He argues that the main objective of the Head of State was to limit Russia to her ethnic borders and thus ensure the independence of Poland. According
to Koko, Piłsudski had a certain vision of the arrangement of territories liberated from Russia. However, as a political pragmatist, he did not have a firm plan for a new order in these lands. He was an opponent of incorporation in the east, and he also looked with irony at the doctrinaire federalism of his associates. Planning to liberate Ukraine from the Bolsheviks, Piłsudski sought to create favorable conditions for the future connection of these lands with Poland (Koko, 1989, p. 29). At the same time, he was faced with a very strong onslaught of nationalists, whose thinking had to be taken into account. According to Koko, the PPS, although they supported the policy of the Head of State and defended him from criticism from right-wing politicians, were not fully aware of his plans. Koko also notes that from the very beginning of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia, Piłsudski was ready for a broad compromise with Ukrainians, including the border issue; however, in August 1919, he sharply changed his position. For Ukrainians, this move reduced the appeal of rapprochement with Poland. Koko, agreeing with the Polish émigré historian Piotr Wandycz, notes: “The Polish-Ukrainian treaty did not originate from the desire to enslave Ukraine, nor was an altruistic agreement from which Poland was not to gain any benefits. Like most international agreements, it was the result of common interests” (Koko, 1989, p. 36).

On the other hand, the Treaty of Riga meant the defeat of Piłsudski’s plans about Russia. Until the end of the communist regime in Poland, the interpretive patterns of the 1950s were also included in textbooks, although the narratives that were presented reflected the progress that took place in research over time (Ajnenkiel, 1964; Buszko, 1978; Czubiński, 1987; Grosfeld & Zieliński, 1969; Tazbir, 1979; Topolski, 1977; Zieliński, 1968, 1983).

Speaking of historiography in communist Poland, it is worth paying attention to historical essays. In this context, Zbigniew Załuski’s book Drogi do pewności [Ways to Confidence] is worth a more detailed presentation. Given the position and background of the author, the views expressed in this book can be considered the official position of the authorities on the interpretation of the history of 1918–1921. According to Załuski, both Polish conceptions of restoration – federalist and incorporative – were based on “restitutionalism”, i.e. the postulate of return to the status quo ante. The only “state of the past” recognized by the Polish public was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the borders of 1772. This “restitutionalism”, according to Załuski, was the product of popular primitivism and the ideology of resurrection (Załuski, 1986, pp. 24–25).

In his view, both Polish programs of Eastern policy had imperialist features: both were anachronistic, unrealistic, and inevitably provoked war with Soviet Russia. In

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6 Zbigniew Załuski (1926–1978) was a Polish army officer, writer and Member of Parliament. In 1969 he was elected member of the Sejm for the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) and continued in the role until his death. In 1974 he joined the board of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society. Załuski also served as the head of the PZPR cell in the Polish Writers’ Union until his death from a heart attack.
addition, both of them were wrong and unethical. In those programs, a people who, like no other, had a clear understanding of the importance of national freedom, was assigned the role of the “people of lords”, colonizers, or moral guardians. “Such roles, or even the ideals of a ‘historical mission’ towards others, corrupt; they corrupt people and nations” (Załuski, 1986, p. 30). Both the idea of incorporation and the federalist model, Zaluski argues, were anachronistic because they were based on a common but erroneous view that little had changed in Europe since the late eighteenth century, that Polishness was still the only organized and influential force in the east, that Jagiellonian Poland still existed materially, as the dominant social stratum, and spiritually, in human hearts and minds; and also that Polishness and Poland could give something to the peoples of the Kresy, specifically hypothesizing that something could impress them and thus dominate them somehow (Załuski, 1986, p. 30). Neither of the Polish political schools accepted the significant change – the national awakening – which in the early twentieth century affected all the peoples of Eastern Europe, who had previously been hampered in development due to foreign violence (Załuski, 1986, p. 31). The idea of reviving Poland within the borders of the eighteenth century, Zaluski argues, was disastrous, because it revived the same problems that Poland had had in the eighteenth century. Poland, he argues, already had the preconditions for decline at those times (Załuski, 1986, p. 32).

As for Petlura, Zaluski believes that the Ukrainian Chief Ataman had no choice but to conclude the alliance with Poland (Załuski, 1986, p. 34). The author argues that the terms of the agreement of 21 April 1920 doomed the Ukrainian People’s Republic to the status of Poland’s junior partner. If the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, supported by all the power of Soviet Russia, turned out to be a success, “Petlura’s Ukraine”, with the capital in Kyiv, would have to stick to Poland and retain the status of a Polish satellite in the east (Załuski, 1986, p. 45). Such an alternative was not very attractive even to those Ukrainians hostile to the Bolsheviks.

Zaluski identifies two paradoxes of the Polish-Soviet war. In his view, the first one was that although Piłsudski won the war, he had to refuse to support Petlura and Bulak-Balakhovich. The second paradox was that Piłsudski won militarily but lost politically: in the negotiations in Riga, his opponents – the National Democrats – took full advantage of this victory and implemented their concept of the Polish eastern border (Załuski, 1986, p. 62).

The second paradox, in his opinion, meant that “Piłsudski’s Poland” was guided by “Dmowski’s rules” in domestic politics. Poland was formally homogeneous but actually multi-ethnic; this situation, created by the Treaty of Riga, determined the course of processes within the Polish state. Dominance over the eastern territories was a factor in the gradual degradation of Poland. In “post-Riga” conditions, governing over these lands was possible only in the style of Dmowski’s concept, which required people and methods prepared by this nationalist movement (Załuski, 1986,
p. 64). Analyzing the nationality policy, Załuski accuses interwar Poland of chauvinism, observing that “there was always Poland A and Poland B”. The situation of Ukrainians in Poland, he notes, was worse than the situation of Poles under foreign rule. All this, in his opinion, eventually led to the popularity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the growth of Polish-Ukrainian hatred. Thus, the nations who inhabited the space between Poland and Russia could not become allies of Poland; quite the opposite. All this influenced the development of “nationalist deviations” in the liberation movement of these peoples. Consequently, such nationalisms could not be an ally of the nationalist Polish state. In this way, the federalist and Promethean illusions of Piłsudski supporters turned into their opposites (Załuski, 1986, p. 67). In the end, “the alliance with Petlura”, Załuski sums up ironically, “ended in a struggle with Bandera” (Załuski, 1986, p. 68).

Conclusions

As can be seen, then, from the late 1940s to 1956, the policy of memory in Poland was entirely in line with Stalinism. In the case of such a politicized issue as Piłsudski’s Eastern policy, the official historiography literally repeated the Soviet narrative. Polish interwar historiography was completely rejected. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Polish policy of memory in this matter did not even have any “national specificity”, being practically an extension of the Soviet one. This narrative was characterized by accusing Poland of having waged an aggressive war against Soviet Russia, and by the image of Poland as a non-independent entity, in fact, a puppet of the Entente. Piłsudski’s goals were explained by the motives of restoring the tsarist system in Russia, the exploitation of Ukraine, and the return of estates to Polish landowners.

A critical change occurred in 1956. After the events in the Soviet Union and Poland, the authorities abandoned the policy of broad repression. Although the party leadership created obstacles to unbiased historical research, it was still unable to turn history into propaganda. Throughout the entire period of the Polish People’s Republic there were attempts to make history a tool of the totalitarian system, but this policy was characterized by constant changes and turns. Historians generally managed to preserve their scholarly integrity and methodological pluralism. This, however, did not mean a full freedom of expression. Soviet clichés, albeit in a veiled form, were still apparent in the memory policy of the Polish People’s Republic. The emphasis on the class character of Piłsudski’s power, which acted in the interests of the landlords, was characteristic of the entire socialist period. The alliance with the Ukrainian People’s Republic was usually characterized as a profoundly unequal arrangement. Most researchers defined Piłsudski’s policy as federalist, which was often considered to
be synonymous with imperialistic. Indeed, Petlura was often presented as a political loser, holding out for the last opportunity to preserve power. Soviet Russia, in turn, was depicted as a victim of Polish aggression.

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Bibliography (Transliteration)


**History Under Censorship:**

**Józef Piłsudski’s Eastern Policy in Polish Marxist Historiography**

(1945–1989)

**Abstract**

The article examines the historiography and history policy in the communist Polish People’s Republic (1945–1989) regarding the Eastern policy of Józef Piłsudski. Poland was one of the most important countries in the socialist camp, and it had a complicated history of relations with the USSR. Under Moscow’s influence, Poland had to adapt its official history to the Soviet one. This was especially difficult to accomplish considering recent hostile Polish-Soviet relations. Consequently, implementing such a history policy was a complex and uneven process. Piłsudski’s policy was treated extremely negatively during the Stalinist period, a view that softened in subsequent years under the influence of a gradual liberalisation of the history policy of the state. Although the general interpretation of Piłsudski’s Eastern policy remained negative until 1989, it became significantly different from Soviet dogmas. The source of this study were both propaganda texts, professional historiography and historical essays.

**Keywords:** Józef Piłsudski; Eastern policy; Polish People’s Republic; history policy; historiography
Historia pod cenzurą: polityka wschodnia Józefa Piłsudskiego w polskiej historiografii marksistowskiej (1945–1989)

Streszczenie


Słowa kluczowe: Józef Piłsudski; polityka wschodnia; PRL; polityka historyczna; historiografia

Dr. Vitalii Borymskyi, Visiting Research Fellow at the Faculty of Political Science and Security Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń; Ph.D. – 2015, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi National University of Cherkasy, Ukraine. He is a winner of the Jerzy Giedroyc Prize awarded by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kyiv (2016). He works on the issue of perception and interpretations of the Polish-Soviet war in Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian societies. His research interests include the history of ideas, political thought, and national consciousness in twentieth-century Ukraine, Poland, and Russia.

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**Correspondence:** Vitalii Borymskyi, Faculty of Political Science and Security Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Toruń, e-mail: vitalij.borimskij@gmail.com

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